Taiwan Today

Changes are underway in long-term policies on Taiwan-Mainland unification and immediate practical issues concerning developing relations.

Taiwan-Mainland relations are in a highly fluid stage of adjustment. In order to better understand the issues involved with the changing government policies in this area, Free China Review turned to a group of experts for their assessments of the situation.

The seminar, held in early November 1990, was chaired by Dr. Jiang Ping-lun (江炳倫), editor-in-chief, FCR. The participants were: Kao Koong-lian (高孔廉), deputy executive secretary, Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan; Lee Sheng-feng (李勝峰), KMT member, Legislative Yuan; Lin Bih-Jaw (林碧炤), director, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University; Jason C. Hu (胡志強), associate professor, Sun Yat-sen Center for Policy Studies, National Sun Yat-sen University; and Chu Hsin-min (朱新民), associate professor, Department of Diplomacy, National Chengchi University. Excerpts follow:

Jiang Ping-lun: In Taiwan and abroad, people in intellectual and political circles have been paying close attention to the evolving relations across the Taiwan Straits. Today, we want to review recent developments in Taiwan-Mainland relations, and to consider some of the possible directions these relations may take in the near future.

Kao Koong-lian: The ultimate goal of our Mainland policy is unification. We expect this to be achieved within a sound system, that is, a democratic and pluralistic society that has a free economy and a culture in harmony with daily life. This does not mean that we will try to force the Mainland into our mold, nor do we want to be forced into theirs. We hope person-to-person contacts will stimulate systemic changes within Mainland China.

We all are conscious of the fact that Mainland China is much larger than Taiwan in both land area and population. Any policy we adopt has to be mindful of the security and welfare of the 20 million people in Taiwan. Therefore, some restrictions are necessary, even if some people criticize the government for having a conservative attitude toward the fast-developing people-to-people contacts across the Taiwan Straits.

The policy of allowing people in Taiwan to visit their relatives on the Mainland dates from November 1987. Over the past three years, we have received no response from the Peking regime about this policy, and therefore we cannot sit down with the Chinese communists and talk about it. In his inaugural speech in May 1990, President Lee Teng-hui clearly stated that “If the Chinese Communist authorities can implement political democracy and a free economic system, renounce the use of military force in the Taiwan Straits, and not interfere with our development of foreign relations on the foundation of a one-China policy, we would be willing, on a basis of equality, to establish channels of communication.” Since we have more than one political party in Taiwan, it is impossible to have party-to-party talks with the Mainland.

In August 1988, the Executive Yuan established the Mainland Affairs Task Force to coordinate with the various ministries and commissions of the Executive Yuan that were actively involved in this area. The new Mainland Affairs Council has recently taken over the work of the task force [October 18, 1990]. The council will have even broader responsibilities in the development of policies governing Taiwan-Mainland relations.

In its two years of work, the task force promoted cultural, trade, and social exchanges with the Mainland. Altogether nineteen measures to liberalize such contacts were issued during this period. We are now evaluating these measures, and intend to put more emphasis on cultural contacts with the Mainland. This is necessary because trade contacts with the Mainland have grown too rapidly and are not well-planned. Although there are some advantages, many problems have arisen.

The government has been criticized for giving in to public pressure when deciding which liberalizing measures to take. That is only partly true. Actually, we planned some of these steps before the public started to have contacts with Mainland people. It was simply a matter of timing the announcement of the measures. The goals of our policy are quite clear, but we cannot give a timetable for the implementation of each measure, because that depends on the conditions and the requirements of the moment.

Our policy concerning dialogue between the two sides of the Straits is that we still adhere to our “three nos” policy of no contact, no negotiations, and no compromise with the Peking regime. Our policy is not aimed at countering the Mainland’s call for the “three communications” [postal service, transportation, and trade]. Actually, the three nos policy means no official contact, negotiation, or compromise between the two regimes. It also lays stress on political matters rather than economic, cultural, or other functional affairs.

The responsibilities of the Mainland Affairs Council include study, planning, coordination, evaluation, and implementation of Mainland affairs policies. I want to emphasize that the council will not have any official contacts with the Mainland. However, we are establishing a non-governmental intermediary organization to handle functional matters involving people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits [the organization was set up on November 21,1990].

It doesn’t matter whether the Peking regime recognizes this intermediary organization or not. Once it is established, it can at least go to work on solving problems that involve people in Taiwan. As for its work with people on the Mainland, the Peking regime should be disposed to work through such an organization. We are confident that the intermediary organization will be able to carry out its functions thoroughly.

Lee Sheng-feng: My experience tells me that people in academic circles, rather than government officials, are the ones who most frequently put forward concrete measures and goals on Mainland affairs. There is no question that the unification of the Chinese people within a democratic framework is the ultimate goal of our Mainland policy. There are several steps for making such a goal practicable.

The first step is to develop Taiwan. As long as we are undeveloped, we are not qualified to talk about unification with the Mainland. Taiwan must be able to stand on its own feet. Top priorities should be constitutional democracy, political reform, economic development, and security for all citizens.

The second step is to influence the Mainland. We can use our achievements to influence the other side of the Taiwan Straits. In the past, we frequently asked the Mainland to give up their “Four Cardinal Principles” [adherence to socialism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the leadership of the Communist Party, and to Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung thought]. This is like asking them to surrender. No one on the Mainland would dare to support such a demand. The things we advocate should be capable of eliciting enthusiastic response from the people there. For example, if we ask the Peking regime to let its people enjoy freedom of speech, I believe we can get strong support from Mainland intellectuals. If there is a breakthrough in freedom of speech, it will be difficult for Peking to maintain the various tight controls on the Mainland.

Is it possible to unify both sides of the Straits even if the Peking regime does not collapse? Yes, it is possible on the condition that the Mainland gives up its one-party dictatorship. The problem is whether the Peking regime will allow people from Taiwan to form political parties in the Mainland, whether Taiwan political parties will be allowed to be active there, and whether people from Taiwan will be allowed to compete for local elections on the Mainland. I’m pretty sure that if Taiwan opened its doors to the Chinese communists to participate in elections here, no one would be elected. But if I went to the Mainland as a candidate, it is the Chinese communists who would be nervous.

As for cultural and sports exchanges, I think we alone would benefit from such contacts, not the other way around. The roots of Taiwan’s culture are on the Mainland, but we have been more influenced by the Western world than the Mainland has. Up to now we have not developed a culture that is particularly our own. Therefore, I do not encourage cultural exchanges. The situation is the same with respect to our athletic capabilities.

Trade is a third way in which we can strengthen our relations with the Mainland. But if the government does not act quickly to develop clearer guidelines, businessmen here will unite with the Mainland regime, because such contacts will benefit both of them. We must proceed now because the conditions that are advantageous to us today will someday change to our disadvantage. That is why I often say that we should talk face-to-face with the Mainland bravely. I admit that this is not the right moment for political talks, but we are at the right stage for non-political talks. If we continue to avoid contacts, we will be forced to have talks with the Mainland in the future under less favorable circumstances. By that time we will have lost our advantages and our bargaining chips.

With respect to the advocacy of party-to-party talks by the Chinese communists, either they are ignorant of realities or they think they can hand us a problem which is hard to solve. Perhaps no one will doubt that the Communist Party represents the Mainland China regime. This is a reflection of the fact that they do not have a sound political system. But does the KMT represent Taiwan? Many people have doubts about this because we have more than one political party. Perhaps the Peking regime is encouraging party-to-party talks because they intend to create a struggle between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party. Nevertheless, my own opinion is that we can agree to talks between the two ruling parties.

With respect to the three nos policy, only the government still adheres to it. The public has long since ignored its prohibitions. The time will come when a great many people on this island have contacts with the Chinese communist regime because of mutual interests, and the ROC government will be the only one that is isolated. Therefore, the sooner we draw up plans for Taiwan-Mainland contacts the better. We might begin our talks with the Mainland on civilian matters, and later move on to government affairs. Or we can begin talks with subjects that have been bothering both sides, and later move on to topics that are advantageous to both sides, all the while strengthening the element of reciprocity. Political talks should be the last step.

Lin Bih-Jaw: Our policy is to promote the Taiwan experience, but without endangering our security. I view the Taiwan experience as a way of life, with both good and bad sides. The government should minimize the negative aspects as much as possible. One of the negatives is the attitude that “money is everything.”

How can we introduce our way of life to people on the Mainland? The first step in promoting our experience is information exchange, which includes international, social, and economic affairs. The second step is trade contacts. Through such contacts, a degree of mutual dependence will be established. The third step is to develop mutual understanding. Only when all these steps are taken can we expect mutual trust to grow to the point where unification would be possible. The reason why I do not include cultural exchanges is because that is our weakest area, the area in which we can contribute the least to the Mainland people. They are superior to us in architecture, the arts, and literature.

I am not as negative as Legislator Lee is concerning unlimited people-to-people contacts with the Mainland. I do not see any loss of advantage for our side in this situation, because the actions of the government and the people here in Taiwan actually reinforce one another. In an open society like ours, it is impossible for our government to control or prohibit such contacts. Intense popular interest in things about the Mainland is understandable because the two sides have been out of contact for more than four decades. The government’s concern about security is also understandable. There will be better coordination between the government and the people in Taiwan with the creation of the National Unification Council [an advisory body under the Office of the President] and the intermediary organization for Mainland relations.

Kao: Both Legislator Lee and Professor Lin have said that cultural exchanges are not desirable. There is some misunderstanding of what I said. It is true that we are inferior to the Mainland in the field of architecture or the arts, but I meant to use culture in a broader sense. For example, in the field of education we can offer scholarships to Mainland people for research on certain subjects. Other forms of cultural activities include academic, TV and broadcasting, and publishing exchanges.

Jason Hu: It seems that both the government and the public have adopted unification as the ultimate goal of our Mainland policy. There are three principles I urge our government to emphasize.

First, we should stress that unification itself is not the key point; instead, unification is a means to achieve democracy and freedom for all China. We should take the initiative and try to create an environment domestically and internationally that is favorable to unification. If we do not have ideal conditions for it, then we had better delay the coming of unification. At the same time we should strengthen exchanges across the Straits as a means of creating favorable conditions for unification.

Second, I do not see any reason for us to begin official contacts with the Mainland regime immediately, inasmuch as we are working hard on developing a private intermediary organization to handle contacts.

Third, many people here think that to achieve unification is to embrace the Chinese communists. On the contrary, they should know that to seek unification is not to accommodate communism, and our policy of openness is not a policy of obedience to their wishes.

There is a contradiction in our policy concerning Taiwan-Mainland relations. At present, we think about our relationship with the Mainland in terms of competition, not in terms of the hostile attitude we had some years ago. But if we think that the goal of competition is to win them over or be superior to people on the Mainland, then they will be disgusted with us. We will never improve our relationship with the Mainland if we adopt this approach.

I believe the final stage of our relationship with the Mainland will be a complementary one. In other words, we will have to find a community of interests, something which we have not been able to do up to now. We are faced by a contradiction, because on the one hand we want to make contacts with the Mainland, but on the other hand we are afraid that our trade or exchanges of information will enhance the Mainland’s strength. To develop a community of interests, our advocacy of unification should be phrased in terms that would benefit both people in the Mainland and the 20 million people in Taiwan. This is the theory, but I have not yet found a workable scenario that satisfies the theory.

I do not maintain that we should never hold official talks with the Mainland. We will, but it has to be in a situation that is favorable to ourselves. Some people who have made trips to the Mainland have told me that we should hold talks with the Mainland as soon as possible because we have bargaining chips now. I differ with this view. Even if talks yielded an agreement with the Peking regime now, it would become a mere scrap of paper by the time our bargaining chips lose their value.

Hong Kong is a good example. Five or ten years ago, the Chinese communists promised that “Hong Kong people will rule Hong Kong” after 1997. The Chinese communists have now forgotten what they said. In fact, Mainland China’s attitude toward us is determined by our actual strength. What we can do now is make ourselves stronger and fight for the most favorable conditions for ourselves. I think we should take a higher posture and a firmer stand on our policy concerning our relationships with the Mainland. We should make it clear that unification must be based on safeguarding the welfare and interests of both the people in Taiwan and in the Mainland.

Chu Hsin-min: According to my observations during two recent trips to the Mainland, the Mainland authorities do not disagree with our “Draft Articles on Relations Between People in the Taiwan Area and in the Mainland Area” and our planned establishment of an intermediary organization. But they do disagree with the way we are going about setting up the organization. The future relationship between the two sides does not lie in the mere promulgation of legislation or the establishment of an organization. Instead, it lies in the effective functioning of the laws and the intermediary organization itself. If they fail to perform their respective functions, they will only be a burden for our government.

I must warn that such a thing might happen. If the intermediary organization cannot win the cooperation of the Chinese communists, it will have difficulties in carrying out its work. Can we call it an intermediary organization if it cannot function in the Mainland? Therefore, it is necessary for us to consult with the Mainland in the process of setting up such an organization, perhaps through a third party, just to show our sensitivity in this matter. Otherwise, when something happens on the Mainland against the interests of people in Taiwan, a lack of effectiveness on the part of the intermediary organization could become a serious political liability for our government.